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LAND REFORM AND THE AGRICULTURAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION

1

This paper discusses some of the technical aspects of land reform with
a view to better understanding its possible impact on income distribution,
the main goal in many cases of land reform.

The model used is designed to

capture the main relevant features of LDC agricultural sectors, i.e. the
different factor proportions typically characterizing farms of different
sizes, different crop compositions and different home consumption ratios. It
is argued that, while land redistribution may be expected to raise agricultural
output in many cases, it may well worsen the distribution of income by lower
ing the demand for hired labor.

The paper attempts to trace out the conditions

under which this result would occur.

There seems to have been a relative ne-

glect in discussions of agrarian reform of the theoretical possibility and
empirical evidence that certain types of reform may lead to a worsening of
•
• t ri.bution.
d 1.s

2

No attempt is made to provide a general discussion of land

reform, 3 so we come to no conclusion as to how frequent this phenomenon is likely
to be.
To simplify. we assume an agricultural population made up of three distinct

1
I am indebted to Benjamin Cohen and Herman Daly for useful comments on an
earlier draft of this paper.
2

on the empirical side, the hypothesis has been put forward that the land re
forms in several countries have lowered the wages of landless agricultural
workers, and possibly worsened distribution in general. See for example, with
respect to Chile, William Thiesenhusen, "Population Growth and Agricultural
Employment in Latin America with some u. s. Comparisons", Land Tenure Center,
University of Wisconsin mimeo, Feb., 1969.

3Thus such dynamic questions as the positive or negative impact on i~vestment
as a result of changes in the security of tenure for various groups, changes
in average savings rates, and the creation of a rural middle-class which may
lead to a better government and stronger community organizations are all dis
regarded. So is the all important political side which inevitably makes or
breaks agrarian reforms by determining whether or not they can be more than
taken size operations .
./
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groups--large landowners, small farmers (either owners or renters), and
landless farmers.

The analysis is directed primarily at the effects of various

types and degrees of reform on the incomes of the landless workers and the
To do so it is necessary also to consider the output effects

small farmers.
of the reform.

Land Reform in the Context of Perfect Markets
As a point in reference it should be remembered that with perfect markets
for products and factors, and with constant returns to scale, factor proportions
would be the same on large farms and small.

1

In fact, as long as there were

no economies of scale, a perfect market for land would not be a necessary
condition for this result - perfect markets for capital, labor, and management
would suffice;

2

non-economic preferences by people to hold land and to farm

their own land would not lead to inefficiencies or different modes of production
(as long as there was no preference not to use the land in production).

Land

reform, by which would be meant simply the transferrence of ownership of land
from one person to another, would imply the transferrence of capital and income
from one person to another, therefore making the· distribution of income from cap
ital and hence overall income distribution more equal. Nothing more. Despite its
unrealism, it may be useful to bear this case in mind to better understand the
subsequent ones.
1
The presence of economies of scale in some crops would lead to larger farms
specializing in them; the larger farms would as a result have different overall
factor proportions from the smaller ones. For a given crop grown on both large
and small farms no difference in proportions would occur.
2

In the presence of economies of scale, and with a perfect land market, land
would be rented in such a way as to be always operated in units of the optimal
size.
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Land Reform With An Imperfect Labor Market
In the context of a more realistic imperfect labor market model, the
danger arises that even a well intentioned reform may lower the welfare of
a possibly substantial group of people already at the bottom of the income
distribution.

To illustrate this possibility in a simple framework, we assume

that there are two types of farms--large ones and small ones; both are owneroperated and they have access to the same technologies; we assume first that
all farms produce the same crop.

1

A third group, landless farmers, work on

the large farms; the small operators and their families are assumed also to
contribute to the labor force on the large farms.

We do not discuss in detail

the labor market mechanism by which the wage rate is set; as long as there
is a relation (in the usual direction) between the demand for labor, the supply
2
from small farms, and the wage rate , the general nature of our arguments is
not altered.
In the pre-reform situation the large scale farmers earn, of course, the
highest incomes, the small farmers lower ones, and the landless farmers the
lowest of all.

Land redistribution involves taking land from the large farmers

and giving it either to the small farmers or the landless workers.

\Je assume here that the family is the relevant economic entity, so a man
would not be considered as landless if his father had land, as long as they
were part of the same consumption unit.
2
Even if the wage rate has an institutionally defined minimum so that the
pressures which would otherwise push it down lead to unemployment instead, the
relevance of the analysis is unchanged.
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In what follows we first outline in a qualitative sense the conditions
under which some important subgroup of the population may be rendered worse off
by the redistribution (after trying to include in the model the key features of
the differences between small and large farms - with the exception of their
different product composition); we then specify in a more quantative way the
effects of certain variables (e.g. the amount of land redistributed) on changes
in the income distribution; finally we present a more general equilibrium frame
work within which we rela~c the one-crop assumption and focus on the effects of
expertal price changes on rural subgroups and the urban poor.

The possibility

of a fall in the incomes of the landless farmers (which are based solely on
wages) is most obvious when the redistributed land goes to the small farmers

1

and their demand for hired workers is less, per unit of land, than was that of
the large scale farmers.
shifts

2

In such a case the demand curve for hired labor

to the left and the wage rate falls, the fall being greater the less

elastic the supply curve, i.e. the greater the difficulties the landless
workers face in moving to some other sector.

The redistribution of income is

thus in,favor of the small owners, and against the large landholders and wage
earners.

1

The greater the amount of land redistributed in this way, the greater

/

Frequently the people chosen to receive land are from the small farm sector;
there is too little land to occupy everyone and to provide adequate incomes
on the farms from which they come, and this group has some managerial exper
ience, which may not be true of the laborers. Many political systems also
favor this result since the small farmers are higher in the social structure
and therefore more capable of mak:i.ng demands than the landless workers.

21£ the marginal product of labor on the typical small farm is zero, for example,
then an addit.ion to t;he land operated by the family, up to the amount for
which t!}~ mat'girtaf prbduc,t of: labor equalled the market wage level, would not
lead I td''the).r 'h.:f;ring .cn1.·•no1;1::,raiiiJ,,:LY.},@,~9F ,9;~ ~}J.·
We dis;euss below the possi'bi.lity-t'fiat the' ·small farm families may withdraw
some of thd.;r memberro from the labor market. ··•·
•.

..

r

-~

;_
.'
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the decrease in the average wage of the landless farmer.

1

If, under the same

circumstances, the land goes to the laborers rather than to the small farmers,
the distributional effect is clearly more favorable (abstracting from the
possibility that the worker's lack of managerial talents may be so extreme as
to prevent him from achieving an income equal to or above the wage rate).

If

the land each of these laborers received was equal to the land he (in effect)
worked on before, then non-recipients would not be any worse off than before;
if the parcels were larger, however, the same sort of negative effect as just
discussed would come into play.
To get an idea of how probable it is that worker's incomes be lowered by
land redistribution and the specific conditions leading to this result, it
is necessary to make the model more realistic, in particular by dropping the
assumption that large and small farmers operate in the same way, i.e. use the
same amount of labor per acre and produce the same amount of output per acre.
It is almost universally true that more labor is expended per acre on small
units and more output is produced.

t

These relationships raise the possibility

that a lowering of incomes of landless labor may not follow from a reform which
gives the land to the small farmers.
Consider once again the case where land is parcelled to the small cul
tivators, who previously were small owners, tenants, or sqatters (our results
are not altered significantly by their previous tenure status).

The impact of

the land transfer on the wage rate will depend on whether the sum of labor hired
by the new operator plus the amount that his family withdraws from the labor

1ne abstract in this discussion from the question of seasonality of labor demand
which,. with respect to the issue at. hand, complicates the analysis without al
tering the conclusions.
2

To my knowledge no country for which such calculations have been made is an
exception; probably some regions with unusual characteristics are.
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market is greater or less than the quantity previously hired on the large
farms, all on a per acre basis.

If it is greater the welfare of the wage

earner will rise; if it is less a fall will result.

Clearly the more surplus

labor there was in the small farm sector before the reform the less likely it
is that this new owner will hire labor.

He may however decrease the supply

of his labor to large farms.
Suppose the typical subsistence farm before the reform can be represented
as in Figure 1 by the marginal product of labor curve TL3 and the total amount
of family labor potentially available for use on the farm itself, ot2 .

The

relationship between the marginal product of labor curve on the original small
farm and the amount of labor which is employed off that farm is described in
Figure 1 by what we will call the "supply price of labor" curve.

It gives the

wage at which the marginal individual would work off the farm as a function of
the number of people on the farm.

(The ordinary supply curve of labor from

the farm is the mirror image of this curve, i.e. it has the vertical line at
L2 as axis and increasing supplies are read off to the left of this origin).
The wage figure used is assumed to be an

11

0n

the farm equivalent, " i.e. if the

man has special transportation or other costs associated with working off the
family farm, this price is net of those costs.

The curve SS 1, as drawn in

Figure 1, reflects the assumption that farmers have a general preference, other
things being equal, to work their own land so that the supply price of their
labor off the farm is greater than its marginal productivity on their own farm.
One would expect this relationship for two reasons: first, most people simply
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prefer to work on their own land; second, someone who does not work his land
has to rent it out and land market ·imperfectio ns are likely to prevent his
receiving a rent equal to the rate of return he could attain by farming him
self, partly due to his own extra familiarity with and interest in his land.
The relationship suggested may be less true for a man's children, brothers,
etc. than for himself, so whether the part of the supply price curve farther
1
The position of the
to the right is as shown here may be more in doubt.
curve correspondin g to th.ose workers for whom the marginal productivit y of
labor on the farm is below the current wage rate is a much discussed question
involving the nature of family decision making, psychology, etc.

There is no

question that the empirical evidence from many countries indicates that
people work on their own land for marginal returns below the going wage rate.
Hhether (or to what extent) this is due to (a) a failure to maximize family
earnings, (b) transportat ion or other added costs involved in working off the
family farm or (c) the fact that the wage rate does not indicate the price
at which another person could if he wished obtain employment is not yet clear.
Even if the marginal members of the farm household (i.e. non-manager s) could
not add to the farm's output, there are reasons to doubt that their supply
2
For example, women and children who do work on t.he
price would approach zero.
1
The difference in supply price to non-agricul tural pursuits between owner and
other members of the family -- a rather related difference -- has been estimated
for Japan by Masui. (See Yukio Masui, "The Supply Price of Labor: Farm Family
Workers" in Kazushi Ohkawa, Bruce F- Johnston and Hiromitsu Kaneda, editors,
Agriculture and Economic Growth: Japan's Experience, Princeton University
Press and University of Tokyo Press, 1970).
2
The desire to work one's own land and comparative advantage in doing so would
presumably be less for this group than for the operator.
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farm would often not work elsewhere for institutional reasons.

Sometimes

(e.g. Japan) women and children completely manage the home plot while men
work in towns; this possibility depends, of course, on the nature of the work
on the farm.

Further, to the extent that the decision to work outside is

more an individual than a family one, - e.g. where the individual who works
elsewhere does not receive much or any support from the family• workers may
not leave unless their income would be as great as or greater than they are
receiving on the farm itself; this level may normally be expected to lie be
tween subsistence and the average income per capita on that farm. Although on
balance these factors suggest that the supply curve to the right of L3 would
be above zero even if marginal productivity were not, it seems also reasonable
to assume that it will be sloping downward toward the horizontal axis, since
whatever reasons impede people from working on other farms are likely to be
1
less and less influential as the number of people on the small plot rises.
Since the costs of communication, transportation, being away from home,
etc. presumably create a gap between the supply price the person would require
if he could work on his own farm and the supply price he would have to receive
to work elsewhere, the evidence that people work on their own land for returns
below the wage rate is not conclusive proof that their supply price as defined

1
The argument, implicit or explicit in various labor surplus models, that
people will work elsewhere only when the wage rate equals the average product
ivity on the family farm would lead to this result since this average product
ivity is a declining function of the number of family members on the given area.
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in SS' of Figure 1 is below the wage rate.

This gap depends on the case;

when large farms and small farms are in a symbiotic relationship, and especially
when the land which constitutes the small farm was made available by the large
landowner precisely with a view to tying down what is basically hired labor 1,
it may not be present.

But looking at a country as a whole, it need only be

present in some cases for its presence to explain part of the use of low
productivity labor on own farms.

For the moment we assume that this differential

is a constant, i.e. does not depend on the extent of surplus labor on a given
farm or on other variables included in the discussion; adding the constant to
the SS' curve gives us a new higher supply pr:i.ce curve

(s 1s 1 ') indicating the

wage which would have to be actually paid to get family members to work else
where.

Thus the number of people from the representative farm described by

Figure 1 who would wish to work elsewhere for a wage of OW0 is L4L2 .

This

would leave OL working on the farm itself.
4
2
When the small scale farmer becomes the operator of a larger farm he
3
must reconsider how much family labor should be used on the farm , whether some

1A fairly typical relation in several Latin countries, e.g., Colombia.
2
we abstract here from the problems associated with the fact that the farmer
will frequently not be receiving more land contiguous with that which he had
before but rather a separate plot. If, on receiving the new plot, he gives
up the land he was on before, then it will probably go to small farmers who
have not received land in the reform, thus making them better off. Or labor
ers, whose wages are forced down by the re form, may get it. This last result
is the most favorable to the previously landless workers, and could alter the
results presented in the text.
3

or he and the individual family members must each make their own decisions, if
that is the way things are done.
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should work elsewhere, and whether any outside labor needs to be hired.
Suppose, as an illustration, that the new larger farm has the marginal product
of labor curve RL of Figure 1.
8

There is now a new supply price of labor curve

(giving the supply price to the hiring farm, i.e. replacing the previous curve,

s 1s 1 1 )

for this family; we assume here that the relationship of the new one,

S S '

to the new MPL curve is the same as the original relationship between

r r '

the same two curves; in terms of Figure 1, the reform would lead to a fall in
labor supply to the larger farms from L L to L L .
4 2
5 2

The impact of this land

transfer on the landless farmers will be positive if the difference L L - L L
4 2
5 2
is greater than the amount of labor previously hired and applied to the trans
ferred land.

If the extent of surplus labor on the small farm had originally

been less, the family would now supply nothing to the labor market, and if the
labor available had been less than 01 , it would now be hiring.
6
As long as the small operator who receives more land either withdraws
some family labor from other farms or hires some labor himself, there is the
possibility that the equilibrium wage rate will not fall.

One factor likely

to work in this direction is the difference in technology and crop composition
between large and small farms; as mentioned above, small farms tend to use more
labor intensive technologies and produce more per unit of land than large ones. 1

1
This difference depends on differences in the sort of product produced, the
extent of absenteeism on the large farms with corresponding managerial in
efficiency, economies of scale, and a series of other factors. For an inter
esting interpretation of the difference see John w. Mellor, "Family Labor in
Agricultural Development" Journal of Farm Economies, Vol. 45, No. 3, August,
1963. An interesting discussion is also found in Peter Dorner "Land Tenure,
Income Distribution and Productivity Interactions" Land Economics, Vol. 40,
August, 1964.

''
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The situation on any given acre may be represented as in Figure 2, where the
marginal product of labor curve correspondi ng to an acre on the large farm
1
With a wage of OW0 the
is below and steeper than that of the smaller farm.
large farm would use OL0 of labor per acre and the small farm would use OL1 .
Whether the landless farmers are hurt or not depends, as noted above,
on whether the increase in total labor use (on all farms together) as a re
sult of the transfer of this unit of land is greater or less than the increased
use of labor of the family which receives the land (on their own and other
people's land).

One might guess that the apparently negative effects of

some land reforms on real wages have resulted from a substantial surplus of
labor on the small farms

1

and a tendency for the supply price of labor to

other farms to be well above the marginal productivit y on the home farm for
smaller numbers of workers but less so for larger ones.

This might be the

case if, for example, the gap for the first few workers resulted from the farm-

1

For our purposes it is not necessary to make precise the reason why small
farms usually produce more output per acre than large ones. It could be, for
example, that the MPL curve is not really lower on the large farm (given the
context of its operation) but that the major factor is that it hires labor only
to the point, (or perhaps short of it) where its marginal productivit y equals
the wage rate, while the small farm goes beyond it. We chose the representation of Figure 2 because much impressioni stic evidence suggests that the large
farm frequently does not have available to it the labor-inten sive alternative s
used by the smaller farm, perhaps because of organizatio nal problems which
would go with those alternative s, or perhaps because they are especially
suitable to products which do not have big markets (and when produced on the
small farm are also consumed there).
2

Note that there may be a tendency to favor households with large families
as recipients of land, on grounds of need. This will work to the disadvantag e
of the landless workers, as pointed out to me by Herman Daly.
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er's preference to work on his own land and the difficulties for his wife
and some of his children elsewhere, while there were fewer problems in having
his grown sons work elsewhere.

Given this situation, it is possible that

the supply of labor to other farms would not decrease much when the change of
farm size occurs.

In the perhaps extreme case where the labor he was applying

to his smaller farm satisfies his needs for labor on the new larger farm, then
his family will continue to supply as much labor to the large scale farm sec
tor as before.

On the other hand, few reforms are such that the land recipient

need hire many non-family workers in his new situation.

Thus any positive

impact on the income of the landless farmer must work through a decrease in
the total labor supply to the large farms via withdrawal of family labor from
that market.
The final impact on the landless farmers can be either positive or nega
tive.

The greater the surplus labor on the small farms before the redistribu

tion, the less the mobility of landless workers out of agriculture, and the
less the difference in labor applied per unit of land between small and large
farms, the greater is the chance that wage rate will fall.

Another relevant

variable is the size of the unit in which the farms are given out; we consider
it in more detail presently.
To summarize: in the model just discussed, redistribution increases total
output, decreases the income of the high income group, increases that of the
middle income group,

(because some families have more land, and possibly

also because some of the land they were working on before may have gone to other
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small farmers), and may either lower or raise that of the landless farmers.
The danger of a negative impact on a substantial number of people is, of
course, less when the redistribution is to previously landless farmers. Prob
ably the major danger here would be a distribution in units larger than the
amount the representative laborer worked on before the refo.rm.

This could

make non-recipients worse off, as we see in more detail below.
Income Effects on Landless Workers as a Function of the Si.ze of Plot.
In both of the two simple models discussed above, the impact of the amount
of land distribution, given the size of parcel handed out, is fairly straight
forw~rd.

The way in which the results depend on the size of plot distributed

is less obvious; we turn now to that question.
Consider first a simple "benchmark" case where only small farmers receive
land, and each receives the same amount of land, and that amount is such that
the large landowners are left with none (or alternatively each is left ~ith
this new standard parcel); i.e. if there are n small cultivators each one
receives 1/n of the total land taken from the large landholders. · I~ having re•
ceived that amount of land each farmer wished at the existing wage rate to hire
a smaller amount of outside labor per acre than was previously used the reform
would lead to a lower equilibrium wage.

Meanwhile the high incomes of the

ex-large landowners have disappeared and the small farmers are better off
than before. And if the small farms use sufficiently more labor than the large
ones so that they also hire more, the equilibrium wage rises.

If the redis

tribution were incomp~ete, the wage rate would change in the directions just

- 16 -

indicated but not as far.
Note that if the size of the plots handed out is larger than A/n (where
A is the total land expropriated from large farmers) not all of the small
farmers get more land.

It is clear that where all land is parcelled out the

equilibrium wage rate would not be positive unless the typical new plot were
large enough so that the marginal productivity of the amount of family labor
available were positive.

1

For larger plots than this, the decrease in the

wage rate would be smaller the larger the plots as long as the labor used per
acre is not a decreasing function of farm size, Le. as long as MPL on the new
plots is a function only of the labor/land ratio and not of their size. With
this assumption the possibility arises that if the parcelling out occurs in
large enough plots the wage rate will actually increase in a situation where
distribution in small plots would have led to a decrease.

No generalizations

are possible, since the issue involves the effect of the land reform on the marginal product of labor curve, something we know little about; 2 most likely,

1
Ee abstract here from both the possibility that a positive disutility of work
would lead the family to hire labor although physically it could supply enough
to lower the marginal productivity to zero, and the possibility that family
members will migrate to other sectors of the economy when the agricultural wage
rate gets low enough. Both can be easily allowed for.
2

In part the question is whether the position of this curve is more a function
of the size of the farm itself, or of the origin of the person doing the managing.
The marginal productivity of labor curve may be higher after the reform because
the large scale operators did not know anything about agriculture, and/or were
absentees, or because they could not oversee an intensive agricultural oparation.
The ex-small farmers may be able to oversee a more substantial operation espec
ially when the basic issue is whether a person is on the farm or not. On the
other hand, to the extent that the tendency to use much labor and achieve very
high output per acre results from high need, when the previously subsistence
farmer has a substantial amount of land he may not be prepared to oversee enough
labor to get the same yields per acre as he had on the smaller plot.
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though, the beneficiary will produce somewhat more per acre than the large
farmer but will find it convenient to substitute capital for labor, and hence
The latter

will not have as high a man/land ratio after the reform as before.

effect may be immediate, especially if the reform makes capital available along
with the land, or gradual if the farmer must accumulate it himself.

If the

effect is strong, it is improbable that any land redistribution which would
not raise the wage rate in the case of equal distribution of all the land among
these ex-small owners would do so if the parcels were larger.
The relation between plot size and changes in the wage rate is complex.
For example, it is possible trat distribution in small plots would lower the
wage rate, distribution in medium sized plots would raise it, and distribution
in still larger ones would lower it.
related

(The second dividing line would be

to the systematic application of machinery and similar labor saving

devices). Figure 3 illustrates this possibility and presents a simple graphic
method of describing a variety of cases.

Size of new farm and labor input

are measured, respectively, on the horizontal and vertical axes.

A fixed labor

(all hired) to land ratio is assumed for the large farms, so total labor applied
is a linear function of the number of acres (curve OL).

OF and OA represent,

respectively, total and family labor applied on small farms as a function of
size.

The concavity of curve OF reflects the assumption that the labor/land

ratio is a decreasing function of size.

Oa is the total amount of family

labor avilable, all of which is applied to the home farm when its size is equal
to or above Ob <1Creas.

Oc is the amount of family labor originally supplied

to large farms an1 the curve OR p~esents the relation between this amount and
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F
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the new farm size.
off the farm.

Hhen this size reaches Od acres, no labor is being supplied

The curve ON shows, as a function of the size of new farm, the

net impact of the land transfer on the demand for the services of landless
workers; that impact is given by the labor demand of the new farm (OF-OA) plus
the labor removed from the market by the small farm families (OR) minus the
decreased demand of large farms (OL).

As suggested above, many factors go

into the determination of the relationships pictured in Figure 3; some of these
have been mentioned but many more would have to be taken into atcount for a
complete picture.
The above discussion can be applied with straightforward modifications to
the situation where the redistributed land goes to landless farmers; it remains
probable that, if average plot size is above A/n, a lowering of the wage rate
fo'.i:' those still in the labo:c market will occur.

Hhere redistribution is

partly to small farmers and ?artly to wage earners the analysis is not much

.

complicated.

1

If there is a tendency for small farmers to receive land first,

then the early stages of the reform may lower the welfare of the landless
workers, but when they start to receive land their situation will, of course,
be improved.

1
The impact on the wage rate will depend on the proportions in which they are
chosen, partly since, other things being equal, the wage rate effect of re
distribution will be more positive when the landless farmers get the land,
but also because these two groups may differ fairly systematically in the amount
of hired labor they use on their new plots.
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Land Reform in a More General Equilibrium Context: Changes in Crop Composition
and in the Marketed Surplus
The potentially negative effect (on landless workers) of land reform
discussed above resulted from the impact of the reform on the demand for
labor in the agricultural sector; since the analysis was partial, it remains
to ask whether this effect might be offset by indirect but positive ones
(e.g. a migration of this group to urban occupations without loss of income)
or accentuated by other negative effects.
He have so far implicitly assumed that any differences in the composition
of output by size of farm are not important for the analysis; we now modify
that assumption to take account of the well-known facts that small farms nor
mally have a higher share of their output in crops for Mame consumption and
specialize in somewhat different crops than do large farms.

As a result of

the first characteristic situations can arise in which the marketed

surpluc;

(quantity of products sold to the rest of the economy) decreases although total
output rises.

Whether this happens depends, among other things, on the land

recipients' income elasticity of demand for food; if output were to stay con
stant it would be almost certain that the marketed surplus would decrease; since
output may be expected to increase under most circumstances, the effect on the
marketable su ·plus is unpredictable.
If the reform leads to a change in total marketable surplus, some prices
must change.

If the surplus increases, one effect will be a negative impact

on small farmers who have not received land but who sell produce competitive
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with that of the reform benefic.iari es.

Price declines may even mean that the

recipients of the land themselves will benefit little or not at all,

(theor

1
etically they could lose ); in general their gains are likely to be less than
expected.

The income effects of the reform, and their relation to its ex

tent, will thus be much less simple than suggested by the partial analysis
presented above.

2

Any direct negative impact on the landless workers may be

either lessened or increased via the production impact of the reform.

A low

er monetary wage is not inconsisten t with a higher real wage for those whose
consumption bundle involves basic food products whose prices have fallen.
Perhaps the major relevance of the size of the marketed surplus lies in
its role as a determinant of the real income of the poorer urban groups; a
decrease in the surplus would have a negative impact on the urban poor and be
associated with a positive effect on the rural poor.

If we assume that these

are distinct groups, the net welfare effect of the decrease in surplus could
be ambiguous.

Since there may be substantial migration from one group to the

other, this assumption might not be a good one.

Although a decrease in marketed

1
This would occur if the elasticity of demand for the crops was sufficientl y
below one to offset the fact that some of the increased output benefits the
farm family directly via home consumption , this positive effect being greater
the greater is the price elasticity of demand for these goods by the family
itself.
2
For exanple, there might be a level of the reform for which prices would
not fall significant ly and for which the major impact is the positive one
on the recipients of the new land; with further redistribut ion the recipients
as a whole might be better off than before but those who have not received
more land worse off; finally even the group of land recipients as a whole may
be worse off than before.
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surplus due to land redistri bution is mentione d frequen tly in the literatu re
(as a theory based predicti on), the sort of decrease which would harm the
urban poor is less likely.

As noted above, a change in composi tion of

output is likely to accompany the change in land distribu tion, since small
farmers produce more subsiste nce type crops for home consump tion; apart from
this; there may also be a systema tic differen ce in the type of crop sold.
Large farms tend to concent rate on "commer cial" crops, while small farms often
produce most of the food products , especia lly those entering heavily in the
1
diet of the urban poor. It would seem likely that the composi tion of the
marketed surplus of the small farm would at least corres pond~ to the
composi tion of demand of the low income urban dweller than would the marketed
surplus of the large farm.·

Under this circums tance the urban poor might

become better off in the face of a decrease in the marketed surplus since the
prices of the food items they consume could fall.

A further aspect of the

phenomenon is that when the cost of food falls in the urban areas, the real
wage employe rs can pay in terms of industr ial goods goes down, so the employ
ment outlook there may improve and some of the direct or indirect benefic iaries
may be lower income people from the rural areas.

If such an effect is importan t,

then a full analysis is sure to become quite complica ted, and a very "genera l
equilibr ium" understa nding is necessa ry before one can predict the final im
pact even on this group.

1

.
. .
In Colombia, for example, the large farms concent rate on cotton, rice, sugar,
etc. and 'the small ones on potatoes , yuca, corn, and the like.
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Conclusions
In the context of a simple three group models (large farmers, small farmers,
landless farmers) we have outlined some of the determinants of how land re
distribution may be expected to affect income distribution - in particular how
it will affect the incomes of landless workers (through the agricultural wage
rate), and of the land recipients.

The fact that a wage decrease is a

definite theoretical possibility(and which a number of observers believe has
occurred in certain countries) suggests a need, in the design of reforms, for
more careful thinking about distribution implications.

Otherwise, given the

all too numerous biases of any system against improvements in distribution, it
II
may be expected that a series of reforms will go awry for "technical reasons,

to match the series which go awry for political reasons.

This may leave few

successes.
Indirect effects, both positive and negative, need also be analyzed, es
pecially those related to the price of marketed products.

No generalizations

emerge from their consideration, but rather the need for much information about
an individual case before predicting the overall impact of a reform.
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